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NeuroscieNce Data aND ForeNsic 
Psychiatric examiNatioN: 
oPPortuNities, threats, aND 
LimitatioNs oF the curreNt Debate
Almost all of the world’s legal systems 
assume that criminal responsibility can-
not be established if the defendant was 
not capable to appreciate the wrongful-
ness of his/her actions (1). Furthermore, 
most Western Penal Codes assume that 
the defendant cannot be convicted if 
he/she is considered unable to evaluate 
the circumstances surrounding the anti-
juridical fact, and/or if he/she is unable 
to control his/her urges, impulses, or 
responses. If a subject lacked these abili-
ties, then courts may use statements 
such as “not guilty by reason of insan-
ity,” “incapacitated person,” or “(partial) 
mental insanity” (2). Recent develop-
ments of neuroscience in clinical practice 
have lead to consider the potential role 
of neuroscience data for assessing crimi-
nal responsibility in forensic psychiatric 
examination (FPE) (3). In the literature, 
opportunities, threats, and limitations of 
the introduction of neuroscience in FPE 
have been widely debated (4, 5). It has 
been proposed that the use of neurosci-
ence data in FPE may, at least in some 
circumstances, support the detection of 
such disabilities. Conversely, it has been 
also stressed the potential misleading role 
of neuroscience data in courts.
Traditionally, the debate focused on four 
major issues:
(a) renowned judgments involving the 
reference to neuroscience data in FPE 
(6–8)
(b) the relationship between brain abnor-
malities and violent behaviors leading 
to criminal acts:
	 *  in conduct disorders (e.g., antisocial 
personality disorder, psychopathy, 
deficit of self-control) (9–11)
	 *  following traumatic brain injury 
(12–14)
	 *  in sleep/awareness disorders (15–17)
(c) opportunities and limitations of neu-
roimaging techniques (e.g., Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging, MRI; functio-
nal MRI, fMRI; Positron Emission 
Tomography, PET) (18, 19), behavioral 
genetics (20), and lie-detection techni-
ques (21)
(d) Heterogeneity in admissibility criteria 
of neuroscience data through different 
legal systems (22, 23). Let’s consider US 
legal system: the rules governing expert 
testimony usually refer to “Frye” or 
“Daubert” approach (24). Furthermore, 
the crucial but controversial role of 
Federal Rules of Evidence (notably FRE 
401, FRE 403, and FRE 702) in US legal 
system is a vexing issue in the literature 
[for a detailed description, (18)]. In 
many legal system, e.g., in Italy, there 
is not something like Federal Rules of 
Evidence and the judge has to evaluate – 
case by case – evidences presented by 
experts (e.g., psychiatrist, psychologist, 
or neurologist). If the interpretation of 
FRE may sometimes be hard and misle-
ading, no specific criteria for admissibi-
lity (except for judge’s decision) may be 
also extremely dangerous.
Our aim is to highlight the critical issues 
about the conditions that support – in spe-
cific circumstances – the introduction of 
neuroscience data in FPE. In other words, 
before advocating or refusing the use of 
neuroscience data in FPE, we have to clarify 
the role that these data can have in FPE (i.e., 
a probative value for forensic assessment).
Firstly, we shortly hint at classical 
 cognitive paradigms and their limitations. 
Secondly, we show that most of the Western 
Penal Codes are shaped assuming a sort of 
dualist model of human cognition. Finally, 
we describe potential misleading implica-
tions of neuroscience data endorsed in a 
dualist legal framework. Even if no neuro-
science data can definitively discriminate 
neither between crime nor a mental defect, 
and neither between culpability nor inno-
cence, we suggest that the introduction of 
neuroscience in FPE may be – in specific 
circumstances – useful and compelling.
theoreticaL hurDLes aND 
emPiricaL chaNces: Which 
imPLicatioNs For ForeNsic 
settiNgs?
Classically, a dualist model of human cog-
nition assumes a clear distinction between 
two different substances: the mind and the 
body (25, 26). In such model, the mind has 
a direct control on bodily parts. In other 
words, the mind (roughly speaking, “men-
tal states”) would control and manage the 
body (roughly speaking, “bodily acts”) 
through a sort of direct causal relationship. 
Recent advances in brain researches have 
arisen new theoretical dilemma. There is a 
widespread agreement, both in philosophy 
(27, 28) and cognitive neuroscience (29, 30), 
that underlines the incompatibility between 
neurobiological data and dualist conceptual 
framework. It is assumed that if neuroscience 
data are introduced in a dualist model, then 
misleading consequences could be taken for 
granted. Recent studies seem demand a break 
with traditional approaches to cognition.
Classical cognitivism and many para-
digms in philosophy of mind consider 
mental operations clearly detached from 
the body, supporting the analogy between 
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indicates just a statistic-laden  correlation. 
Neuroscience cannot definitively discrimi-
nate neither between crime and a mental 
defect, neither between culpability and 
innocence.
coNcLusive coNsiDeratioNs
If it is widely assumed that neuroscience data 
cannot be profitably endorsed in a dualistic 
perspective, and if it is possible to show that 
the most of Western Penal Codes are shaped 
on a dualistic model, then there are compel-
ling reasons to encourage a new perspective 
also in the forensic field. As above reported, 
it is not a theoretical proposition without 
practical consequences. We have stressed 
the idea that empirical data cannot directly 
assess criminal responsibility. Neuroscience 
data may be useful – in specific and limited 
circumstances – to give aid to traditional 
forensic assessment for mental capabili-
ties. Clearly, not all neuroscience data may 
assume the same explanatory value, and not 
all data may be useful in FPE. The renowned 
debate on fMRI data is illustrative. On one 
side, researches both in biological psychia-
try and neuropsychology have been consid-
erably improved by fMRI studies (43, 44); 
on the other side, the effective implications 
of such studies are still controversial in 
clinical practice (45) and also in different 
research fields (e.g., economic behaviors, 
forensic settings, moral development, etc.) 
(18, 46, 47). Nevertheless, the debate on the 
probative value of specific neuroscientific 
techniques overcomes the aim of this work.
In conclusion, we suggest that the prelim-
inary condition to introduce neuroscience 
data in FPE is the assumption of a new per-
spective overcoming classical dualist mod-
els. Such new perspective permits to rule out 
misleading assumptions (i.e., the determinis-
tic link between “mental defect” and specific 
behavior). Noteworthy, it is a necessary but 
not sufficient condition to introduce neuro-
science data in FPE, given that such data has 
to be evaluated case by case.
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execution, of action perception, and more 
generally a new model for human cogni-
tion. Such theoretical considerations are not 
without practical consequences: the value of 
neuroscience data can be misunderstood if 
we endorse them into a misleading perspec-
tive. In the next part, we show how and why 
these considerations may concern also FPE.
DuaList moDeL iN the ForeNsic 
FieLD: Which ProbLems, iF aNy, With 
NeuroscieNce Data
To assess criminal responsibility, Western 
Penal Codes usually consider two specific 
elements. The individual’s body that has 
materially performed a crime (res extensa, 
latin for matter of facts) and individual’s 
mind has taken the decision to commit the 
crime (res cogitans, latin for mental capabili-
ties). As above reported, it is also scheduled 
the possibility that a “mental defect” assessed 
in FPE restrains the possibility to attribute 
criminal responsibility. This model not 
only seems remind the dualist framework 
but it also reflects the way in which foren-
sic psychiatrists usually are called to make 
assessments about mental capability. Let’s 
consider the Italian case. Italian Penal Code 
assumes a clear distinction between mind 
and body, internal mental states, and exter-
nal bodily acts. At trial, an Italian judge asked 
a psychiatrist or psychologist an assessment 
about “mental capability” of the charged 
(Codice Penale, art. 88–89) (42), that is 
to distinguish between crime (i.e., naively 
“badness”) and mental defects (i.e., naively 
“madness”). However, there are some prob-
lems if we want to improve the assessment 
in FPE introducing also neuroscience data. 
“Mental defect” is an extremely ambiguous 
definition: does “mental defect” include 
also neurobiological data or, more classi-
cally, does it exclusively refer to a behavio-
ral model? Moreover, the Italian judge asked 
the expert to clarify the “influence” (i.e., they 
intend causal link or deterministic relation-
ship) between such as “mental defect” and 
mental abilities during the criminal act. 
In a dualist perspective, where mind (i.e., 
“mental states”) directly control the body 
(i.e., “bodily acts”), it is possible to suppose 
a causal link between “mental defect” and 
specific behavior (e.g., aggression). From the 
perspective of clinical neuroscience, this is a 
misleading  supposition. In fact, experimen-
tal data cannot retrospectively assess such as 
deterministic relationship, given that it can 
higher  cognitive functions and specific 
 computations. Following such perspectives, 
the content of mental representations should 
be explained in terms of pure mental states 
(i.e., intentions, beliefs, and desires). From a 
different point of view, an embodied perspec-
tive claims that many features of cognition 
deal with (causally or even constitutively) 
physical body (31, 32). It is still controversial 
the role of mental representation in embod-
ied approaches. Some scholars have proposed 
the concept of “body representation” (such as 
a distinctive class of mental representation), 
claiming that they are the most promising 
notion to promote an embodied approach 
to social cognition (33). Others have pro-
posed the notion of “embodied simulation,” 
arguing that one can understand others by 
reusing one’s own mental states or processes 
such as representations formatted in terms 
of bodily format (34). Both topics are hotly 
debated in the literature (35, 36).
Experimental studies seem support the 
idea that a new theoretical framework of 
human cognition has to be drawn. Let’s 
consider an interesting case. Mirror neurons 
are a distinct class of visuomotor neurons 
discovered in the ventral premotor cortex of 
macaque monkeys (37). More recently, evi-
dences of the existence of a mirror neurons 
system in humans come from non-invasive 
neurophysiological techniques and neuro-
imaging studies (38, 39). Anatomically, two 
main cortical networks with mirror prop-
erties have been described in humans: the 
first one is the parieto-frontal mirror system 
(formed by the parietal lobe and the premo-
tor cortex plus the caudal part of the inferior 
frontal gyrus); the second one is the limbic 
mirror system (formed by the insula and 
anterior mesial frontal cortex) that provides 
a direct understanding of emotions of oth-
ers without higher order cognitive media-
tion (40). The role of parieto-frontal mirror 
circuit is hotly debated in the literature. The 
major interest concerns its functional role in 
action/intention understanding, in imitation, 
and more generally in social cognition. Even 
if many mechanisms may mediate the under-
standing of other’s behavior, a compelling 
view supports the hypothesis that parieto-
frontal mirror circuit is the only mechanism 
that allows to understand the action of others 
“from the inside” (41). The case of mirror 
mechanism is  emblematic; it seems support 
the hypothesis that recent advances in neu-
roscience demand a new theory of action 
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